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Contracting within the Research and Development arena is
a unique process aimed at obtaining from industry increases
in the technological base necessary for the acquisition of
modern weapon systems. As a unique process, the application
of traditional controls oftentimes presents real problems to
those field level personnel operating in the contracting arena.
This thesis examines in depth several major contemporary
problems perceived by laboratory personnel as hindrances to
their effectiveness. These problems are broadly categorized
into four main issues. First, the contract type best suited
to R&D is addressed; second, the Contracting Authority levels
and granting process are discussed; third, the restricting
framework of existing regulations is examined; and fourth, the
responsibilities of technical managers in the area of contract
management are presented.
Conclusions and Recommendations are offered which will pro-
vide a more efficient framework within which the R&D laboratory
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. OBJECTIVE OP RESEARCH
This research, effort was aimed at the identification of
contemporary problems within the contracting process at the
Chief of Naval Material (CUM) Laboratories. Once specific
problems were identified, the backgrounds were examined, the
historical development of the issues studied, and viable
solutions proposed.
It was intended that the research would result in posi-
tive solutions for implementation at both the field level
and policy making levels within both the CNM lab structure
and the contracting structure.
B. RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary research question upon which this effort
was based was: What problems within the contracting process
are perceived by technical and contracting personnel within
the CNM lab community? This primary question then led to
several secondary or ancillary questions.
1. How did the problems develop?
2. Why have no viable solutions been developed to date?
3. What are positive solutions to the problems?
4. What organizational component(s) within the Navy can




Due to the researcher's having served as the Contracting
Officer at one of the CNM labs, and his resultant familiarity
with both the lab structure and the contracting process, the
scope of this effort was drawn around the relationship between
these two factors. The involvement in the day-to-day opera-
tions provided a first hand perspective for some problems,
however, the detached perspective during the research effort
afforded the researcher an opportunity to more effectively
evaluate other individuals' perceptions.
D. ASSUMPTIONS
The researcher assumed that the reader of this thesis
possesses a basic understanding of both the laboratory environ-
ment and the Research and Development (R&D) contracting pro-
cess employed within the Navy. Such personnel as technical
managers and contracting managers serving at either CNM labs,
policy level commands, or other support activities are the
individuals for whom this study is primarily intended.
E. METHODOLOGY
Initially, a preliminary literature search was conducted
to identify some contemporary problems within the R&D con-
tracting arena. Interviews were conducted with senior policy
level individuals to gain their perspectives on problem areas

which they perceived to be of importance. Subsequent to
this preliminary effort, interviews were conducted with
various field level technical and contracting personnel.
This effort was the main thrust of the problem identifica-
tion process. While not all labs were contacted, a repre-
sentative sample was obtained, i.e., enough problems were
identified to provide for fruitful research.
At this point, the existing literature was examined
for background information on the problems identified, and
problem analysis was conducted. The resulting conclusions
and recommendations are those solely of the researcher.
F. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Due primarily to the contemporary nature and significant
specificity of the problems identified, the literature base
consisted primarily of Government documents and working
papers. A very limited amount of academic material or commer-




This contract type specifies delivery of an end
product at a point in time. The description of the end
product is provided in the schedule or statement of work,
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and constitutes the scope of the effort. Upon delivery
and acceptance of the end product, the contract is considered
complete. If, under a cost reimbursement arrangement, the
contractor has not completed work within the estimated cost,
he is nontheless obligated to finish the effort as long as
the Government funds the effort. Under a fixed price arrange-
ment, the contractor is obligated to perform until the end
product is delivered, assuming himself all costs above the
established fixed price.
2. Term Contract
This contract type specifies as the scope of work a
period of time, usually expressed in man-days, at the end of
which the contract is considered complete, regardless of the
progress made. The contractor is not obligated to continue,
even if the Government is willing to fund additional effort.
3. Basic Ordering Agreement
A written instrument of understanding (not a legally
enforceable contract per se) between the contractor and the
Government. It sets forth the contract clauses applicable
to future procurements entered into between the parties
during the term of the agreement. It is used to eliminate
extensive and costly negotiations when a substantial number
of separate contracts may be entered into with a contractor
over a period of time.
11

4. Contract Management Review (CMR)
A CMR is conducted "by a regional contracting office
to assess the effectiveness of a field contracting office.
It is similar to an operational or compliance audit, in that
non-compliances with regulations are cited and more effective
methods of operating are recommended. The CMR report is
used during the decision process for granting increased
levels of contracting authority.
5. Determination and Findings (D&F)
This is a written justification "by a contracting
officer or higher authority for (a) entering into contracts
by negotiations, (b) making advance payments in negotiated
contracts, or (c) determining the type of contract to be
used. The Defense Acquisition Regulation requires D&F T s
to be approved at various levels from the contracting officer
up through the Service Secretary.
H. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
In addition to the Introduction, which provides the
reader with the perspectives of the researcher and a des-
cription of the research effort in general, this thesis




This segment (Chapter II) initially identifies for
the reader the CNM laboratory structure, the mission of
these organizational units, and a description of how the
Navy "buys Research and Development. It then outlines the
contracting process within the CNM lab arena, with specific
emphasis on the unique nature of R&D contracting, and the
relationship between CNM and the Naval Supply Systems
Command (NAVSUP). Finally, the framework provides a brief
outline of the regulatory system applicable to the R&D
contracting process utilized by the CNM labs.
2. Issue Development
During the problem identification phase of this
research effort, four main issues were addressed with near
unanimity by both technical and contracting managers within
the laboratory community. These four issues to be addressed
and analyzed deal with (1) the appropriate contract type
used in R&D (Chapter III), (2) the amount of contracting
authority granted by NAVSUP, and the process by which it is
granted (Chapter IV), (3) the restrictive framework within
which the contracting is conducted (Chapter V), and (4) the
responsibilities of laboratory personnel in the area of con-
tract management (Chapter VI). For each of these issues,
the background will be presented, the current status given,




The researcher's conclusions and recommendations
are presented in this final segment (Chapter VII). Conclu-
sions drawn are the result of the research, with recommenda-




A. THE LABORATORY ENVIRONMENT
1. Laboratory Organization
In 1966, the Chief of Naval Material assumed command
of the major Navy laboratories. During the subsequent years,
consolidations were effected which resulted in the present
laboratory structure as depicted in Appendix A. This research
effort applies to seven of the eight CNM commanded labora-
tories. The Naval Personnel Research and Development Center
(NPRDC) is excluded due to its rather specialized human
resource research functions. The remaining seven CNM labs
are more involved with weapon system development and primary
research aimed at hardware. The following are the missions
of the seven CNM Research facilities: [23:25)
a. NAVAL AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER (NADC) - The principal
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) center for
naval aircraft systems less aircraft-launched weapon systems.
b. NAVAL COASTAL SYSTEMS LABORATORY (NCSL) - The
principal activity conducting RDT&E in support of Naval
Missions and operations that take place primarily in the
coastal (continental shelf) regions; includes RDT&E for mine
countermeasures, diving and salvage, coastal and inshore




c. NAVAL OCEAN SYSTEMS CENTER (NOSC) - The principal
RDT&E center for command, control and communications; ocean
surveillance; surface and air launched undersea weapon sys-
tems and supporting technologies.
d. DAVID W. TAYLOR NAVAL SHIP R&D CENTER (DTNSR&DC) -
The principal RDT&E center for Naval vehicles and logistics;
provides RDT&E support to the U. S. Maritime Administration
and maritime industry.
e. NAVAL SURFACE WEAPONS CENTER (NSWC) - The principal




NAVAL UNDERWATER SYSTEMS CENTER (NUSC) - The
principal RDT&E center for submarine warfare and submarine
weapon systems.
g. NAVAL WEAPONS CENTER (NWC) - The principal RDT&E
center for air warfare systems (except ASW systems) and
missile weapon systems.
Each laboratory plays a unique, but not mutually
exclusive role in the overall research and development arena.
However, due to the lack of an effective communication system
and higher level coordination, there is some overlap of work
assignments and technology exploration. £23:34-3 For this
reason, and the fact that the labs are Navy Industial Fund
activities, there is a sense of competition among various
labs for sponsor funded work. This competitive spirit is
judged by some to be a positive force in keeping the rate
structures within affordable boundaries.
16

2. The Navy Research and Development Process
The basic intent of the in-hoiise R&D effort as performed
by the CNM labs is to develop products and technology for
internal use. The customer, so to speak, at whom the research
and development effort is aimed is the Navy user, ultimately
the fleet operating forces. Occasionally, due to some over-
lap of technological application, other military services
can benefit from potential developments. This effort can be
broadly classified into two areas: (1) technology base effort
involving the application of various alternative solutions
to new Navy requirements, and (2) systems development wherein
specific military capabilities are addressed in an engineering
sense. [l9j
The question of why the Government has in-house
laboratories to perform the missions described has been
addressed regularly throughout the past. In fact, since 1960,
there have been 18 studies conducted on the in-house labs,
all of them universally united in their conclusion that the
research mission of the Government can best be served by
retaining an in-house capability. The reasons for this
uniform conclusion are summarized in six major points: J31: 3)
First , the laboratories are required to infuse the art
of the possible into military planning.
Second , laboratories are required to maintain the technology
base in mission areas associated with the services' require-
ments and in particular in those areas where there is not
heavy industrial involvement.
Third , the laboratories are required to couple technological
opportunities to operational needs; to identify when the
17

technological opportunities become available which can
significantly impact the capability of operational forces.
Fourth
, and this is a most important role, the laboratories
serve as the Services "smart buyer" in defense systems
acquisition. American -industry has the capability to
conceive, to demonstrate, and to develop competent mili-
tary hardware. However, experience has shown time and
time again that when there has not been a "smart buyer"
working with the contractor, the government has obtained
systems which would not satisfy the requirement in the
operational environment. Without a "smart buyer", the
government has found it impossible to compete productions
on those systems.
Fifth, the laboratories are required to respond rapidly
in times of national crisis. The job that the laboratories
did early in the Viet Nam conflict is exemplary.
Sixth , the laboratories are required to maintain and provide
specialized facilities which are not practical in the
private sector.
While the Navy labs, then, have such a diverse and
comprehensive role to play in the entire acquisition cycle,
it is imperative that they be operated as efficiently as is
possible. This research effort was directed at one area of
operations wherein the top level management of the laboratory
community feels constrained in its ability to effect cost
and time savings - the contracting process. £3^
B. THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CONTRACTING PROCESS
As was stated in Chapter I, it is assumed that the reader
is familiar with the contracting process as employed by DOD
in general, and the Navy labs in particular. However, to pro-
vide a framework from which several distinctions can be drawn
as they relate to R&D contracting, the basic phases in the






This phases involves a team effort between the
technical community and the contracting agent to determine
the "best overall strategy to be used to obtain the required
items or services. Such concerns as competition, socio-
economic programs, adequacy of the specification, required
delivery date, and all necessary approvals within the con-
tracting cycle are addressed. It is understood that at this
time the users and technical community have translated the
need into a specification with adequate funding provided.
b. Solicitation
This phase involves the actual mailing of a
solicitation to industry, expressing the Government's needs
as completely yet succinctly as possible.
c. Source Evaluation and Selection
Upon receipt of industry's proposals, the evalua-
tion and selection process begins. This involves different
procedures, depending upon whether the procurement is being
formally advertised or negotiated. Briefly, the selection
in formal advertising is based upon the lowest bid submitted,
while in a negotiated procurement, the cost and technical
approaches are considered concurrently.
d. Negotiations
This phase involves mutual discussions between
the Government and contractor(s) to arrive at what both parties
19

agree to as fair and reasonable contract terms (cost or




This phase is the culmination of all efforts to
date in the process. The contract is issued, with all terms
and conditions defined and agreed upon by both parties.
f. Contract Administration
This final phase involves the monitoring of the
work being done, the making of any necessary changes, and
the closing out of all related records during and after
performance and delivery by the contractor.
2. Basic Concepts
During the contracting phases just described, several
basic concepts were found to provide the baseline guidance
for all DOD procurement:
a. Formal advertising is the preferred method of
contracting - vice negotiation.
b. Maximum competition shall be obtained in all
cases.
c. The Government shall state its minimum meeds
to industry.
d. An arms-length relationship shall exist at all
times within the contracting process.
3. The Unique Nature of Research and Development
Belden and Cammack describe the process of contracting
for R&D as follows:
20

"The procurement of research requirements from the private
sector of the economy represents another distinct class
of procurement operations with characteristics and tech-
niques peculiar to the process of acquiring basic knowledge.
By its very nature, procurement of research involves close
association with the educational and scientific community
and has as its objective, the identification and use of
the best technical competence that can be obtained (emphasis
added ) . Contracting for research is largely a process of
obtaining the best efforts of a group of individuals to
produce a much less precisely definable product than is
bought through other types of procurement." (j2 : 6}
Comparing this description with the four previously
outlined aspects of DOD baseline guidance results in an
interesting anomaly.
a. Formal Advertising
The prerequisites for the use of formal advertising
are, (1) adequate specifications, (2) adequate price compe-
tition, (3) adequate time, and (4) lowest price as the basis
for award. [2:95) In the typical R&D procurements researched,
the only one of these four prerequisites oftentimes present
was adequate time. Even this may not be present in many
instances as indicated by one of the laboratories' many
reasons for existence - to respond rapidly in times of national
crisis. [31t3l Several interviewees stated that the product
is rarely completely definable, there is seldom a large com-
petitive base within industry, and seldom is price used as
the basis for award. Rather, an undefined product is often
purchased from a technological innovator on a sole source
basis. When technical competition does exist, the technical
approach or understanding of the requirement is used as the




It appears that the goal to obtain maximum com-
petition is not consistent with the R&D goal of drawing upon
the best talent within the educational and scientific community.
When advancing the state of the art in a given technological
area, the R&D manager is not interested in giving the contract
to the low bidder among a large group of competing firms.
This would be a risky course of action, one which could result
in little, if any, progress towards attaining the technical
goals of the procurement. Additionally, the R&D industry
is often so specialized as to preclude the existence of com-
petition. In fact, a review by the researcher of sample
awards made by the labs during the first half of FY 79 indi-
cates that less than 25 percent were made on a competitive
basis. If these awards were stratified to include R&D awards
only, the researcher contends that this figure would be even
lower.
c. Minimum Needs
While this goal is highly desirable in the pro-
curement of repair parts, base support services, and other
areas of contracting, when applying it to R&D, the anomaly
becomes readily apparent. R&D contracting is attempting to
buy the best technical effort available, not the cheapest,
while still meeting minimum needs. For this reason, the
evaluation plans for many R&D procurements are weighted so
as to result in the selection of the best contractor. It is
the general concensus among technical managers interviewed,
22

that when dealing with advanced technology, it is essential
that the public sector monies be spent where the most fruit-
ful results are anticipated, i.e., from a highly competent,
proven scientific team.
d. Arms-length Relationship
Again, the normal contracting process dictates
that the contractor not be closely monitored, but that he
be given the independence to perform as agreed to in the
terms and conditions of the contract. This applies to both
hardware and services types of procurements. Realizing that
when acquiring major weapons systems, a great deal of dialogue
must ensue to protect the Governments interests, the regula-
tory framework regarding changes, disputes, and claims assumes
that the amount of extra-contractual contact between the Govern-
ment and industry technical counterparts will be limited.
In the R&D contracting arena, however, the mutual benefit
obtained from a regular, meaningful dialogue is recognized
as essential to the process of advancing technology. In fact,
the contract types utilized within R&D contracting should
recognize a significant amount of dialogue. The close asso-
ciation between Government and industry which Belden and Cammack
speak to is regarded by laboratory managers as critical to
their success. £l5J
4. Chief of Naval Material vs. Naval Supply Systems Command
As depicted in Appendix A, the organizational relation-
ship between the labs and NAVSUP is an interesting one. The
23

labs report to CNM for their line authority. The success or
failure of the labs to meet their mission goals and objectives,
the resources necessary for this effort, the reputations of
the labs in meeting their obligation to customers, and the
continued development of the labs as viable entities are of
immediate concern to CNM. NAVSUP, on the other hand, controls
the contracting authority for each lab, establishes contracting
guidelines to follow, and is responsible for the evaluation
of the labs contracting proficiency.
With NAVSUP reporting to CNM, the uniqueness of the
labs relationships with each become more apparent. Other
field activities report to either NAVSUP, as in the case of
Navy Regional Contracting Offices (NRCO), Naval Supply Centers
(NSC), etc., or to other Systems Commands, which are at the
same organizational level as NAVSUP. The resultant frustra-
tion experienced by the laboratory manager, as indicated to
the researcher during various interviews, stems from his being
accountable to CNM for his overall performance, but to NAVSUP,
a subordinate command to CNM, for his contracting authority.
5. Regulatory System
The regulatory framework within which the contracting
process is conducted is comprised of four main components -
Public Law, the Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR),
General Accounting Office Decisions, and Executive Branch
Policy. [2:73-88] A brief description of each is provided




At present there are estimated to be over 2000
laws on the books which have some bearing on the contracting
process. [44) While the great majority have a very minor
impact, many are specifically addressed to contracting. The
contracting officer and his team members must be mindful of
the provisions of these laws so as to conduct their business
within the framework intended by Congress. Some of the most
important legislation bearing on contracting is:
(1) Service Contract Act of 1965
(2) Walsh-Healy Public Contracts Act
(3) Truth in Negotiation Act
(4) Buy American Act
(5) Small Business Act
(6) Anti-Deficiency Act
(7) Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947
b. Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR)
Formerly known as the Armed Services Procurement
Regulation (ASPR), and established by the Armed Services
Procurement Act of 1947, the DAR provides a uniform set of
statutory based regulations within which DOD must operate.
The underlying principles of military procurement are addressed
in great detail, from types of contracts to defense contract
financing. A new regulation, the Federal Acquisition Regula-
tion (FAR) is being written by the Office of Federal Procure-
ment policy (OFPP) and will contain basic policy and procedural
25

guidance, while the DAR will contain implementation pro-
cedures unique to DOD.
c. General Accounting Office Decisions
"Through his statutory power to settle and adjust public
accounts
. . .
the Comptroller G-eneral exercises final
review authority over the procurement activities of the
Government." [2:74]
The contracting officer within the R&D community
therefore, must answer to the Comptroller General for the
propriety of his actions, and the validity of the procedures
he uses, therefore, the Comptroller General has a substantial
impact upon the legal framework within which contracts are
executed and administered.
d. Executive Branch Policy
In addition to the Navy's own implementing con-
tracting guidance - Navy Contract Directives and the Field
Purchasing Manual (NAVSUP 467), the Office of Federal Pro-
curement Policy (OFPP) issues directives and memoranda
periodically which govern the actions of contracting officers.
Examples of such guidance are:
(1) OMB Circular A-109, subject: Acquisition
of Major Systems
(2) OMB Circular A-76, subject: Acquiring of
Commercial or Industrial products or services needed by the
Government.
The Navy has internally a broad base of instruc-
tions which apply to the contracting process - too many to
delineate at this juncture. Suffice it to say that the
26

contracting officer and his team have a challenging task
before them at all times in light of the entire sphere of




III. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CONTRACT FORMAT
A. BACKGROUND
1. Critlcality of Contract Type
During the performance of his multi-faceted role
as an acquisition team member, the Contracting Officer exer-
cises many responsibilities. Among these complex duties
is the selection of the contract-type best suited to the
requirement. Research has indicated that this decision is
critical to the success of any acquisition for several
reasons:
a. The proper balance of risk distributed between
the Government and the contractor is essential to incentivize
performance. The contract type allocates this risk.
b. The cost to both the Government and the contractor
in the administration of the contract should be kept to a
minimum while still ensuring that proper controls are present.
The type of contract determines cost of administration to a
great degree.
c. An appropriate level of control over the con-
tractor's performance is critical to successful completion.
The contract type determines to some extent the level of con-
trol possible within legal boundaries.
The issue to be discussed here addresses a contract
type not specifically described in the Defense Acquisition
28

Regulation (DAR) - the Work Assignment Contract (WAC).
Technically, these contracts can be categorized within one
of the general cost-type classifications, i.e., Cost-Plus-
Fixed-Fee (CPFF) or Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF). However,
the unique ordering provisions and administration aspects
set the WAC apart from either a normal completion contract,
or a standard term level-of-effort services contract.
2. Work Assignment Contract Development
In the mid 1960 f s, the Navy Regional Procurement
Office in Los Angeles (now Long Beach) working with three
of the Navy's principal RDT&E centers (the Naval Weapons
Center, China Lake, the Pacific Missile Test Center, Pt. Mugu,
and the Naval Undersea Center, San Diego), recognized a need
for a unique contract type for "basically two classifications
of procurements. The first was the R&D service contract
issued to provide white-collar, highly technical services on
a continuing basis over an extended period. The second was
the development hardware contract. In both cases, the nature
of the work to be performed was wide-ranging, and it was
impossible for the user to define even in imprecise terms
the extent of effort which would be required throughout the
proposed term of the contract.
The solution developed became known as the Work
Assignment Contract. Basically, it involves the issuance
(competitively or sole source) of a master contract by the
Contracting Officer, outlining in very simple terms the broad
29

nature of work to be performed. Subsequently, as more
definitive segments of work are identified, Work Assignments
(WA's) or Task Orders (TO's) are issued by designated ordering
officers against the master contract. It is similar in nature,
therefore, to a delivery order contract. The ordering offi-
cers are generally located within the requiring activity
organizations.
3. Conditions for Use of Work Assignment Contracts
As mentioned previously, there are two basic categories
of WAC's - the R&D service contract and the hardware develop-
ment contract. The line between these two types often becomes
rather cloudy, since in many hardware development efforts
the greater majority of the costs associated with the con-
tracts are engineering labor, with very little material costs
being incurred. Nonetheless, a closer examination of the
application of the WAC to each of these requirements is in
order.
In looking at the R&D services area, research indicates
that the services involved are highly technical in nature and
easily distinguishable from a blue-collar services situation.
In the latter situation, a general specification is included
in the contract, the contractor performs as required, the
Government inspects the work performed, and payment is made.
These types of contracts are generally fixed price or time
and material. In contrast, the white-collar R&D services
30

are procured most often under a cost-type contract, there
is frequent dialogue between the contractor and the Govern-
ment, and the results of performance are often times very-
difficult to "inspect and accept".
A typical example of the application of a WAC is the
procurement of "analytical and empirical investigations in
the areas of target vulnerability/survivability, warhead
design, terminal ballistics, blast loading and response, and
component vulnerability". This scope of work statement was
extracted from a contract issued to a research firm in 1976.
One would be inclined to admit that the scope is rather
broad. In fact, detractors from the WAC concept often charac-
terize the scope of work as being too broad; hence, subject
to misuse. [26:11] However, when further analyzing the use
of the WAC in this type of setting, the developer's need for
a broad scope becomes more apparent.
In this particular case, a systems command had funded
a major laboratory to support an exploratory development pro-
gram. The broad general direction of the ensuing research
was known, however, no specific requirements could be identi-
fied. Due to a lack of sufficient in-house expertise, the
lab had to contract for many of the scientific studies
necessary for program progress. Imagine now, the technial
project head establishing small increments of work to be per-
formed independently and sequentially. If the only contracting
instruments available were completion or term type contracts,
31

the individual increments would have to be contracted for
separately. Originators of the WAC indicate that this situa-
tion would be untenable from a program continuity perspective.
With the WAC concept, a master contract is awarded,
outlining in broad terms the work to be done, and containing
all required terms and conditions. As new work packages are
identified, a work assignment is issued to the contractor,
citing the specifics of performance, the estimated cost of the
effort, any unique reporting requirements and an estimated
date for completion.
The major advantage as regarded by users of the WAC
in the area of R&D services is the ability to respond quickly
to sponsor requests for research or development studies and
investigations; and when coupled with potential savings in
contracting effort required, the WAC appears even more attractive
to users. Consider the case of twenty different project heads
all requiring similar services in a particular technical field,
within thirty days of each other and amounting to $20,000.
Without a WAC, it would be necessary to negotiate twenty
different contracts with similar scopes or attempt to combine
them in a single procurement. This latter option would mean
a significant delay in performance for all but the last one.
However, with a WAC in force, the administrative process of
issuing each of the twenty WA's could be accomplished in a
matter of days, as research has shown in a review of sample
lead time reports at labs.
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The hardware development effort also provides an
application of the WAC concept. Consider again, a sponsor
funded request to advance the state-of-the-art in the area
of rocket motor research. All that is known initially by
the lab is that the existing designs are not performing at
a satisfactory level. New designs, materials or assembly
processes must be examined to determine if a more suitable
motor can be developed. Since a typical hardware development
effort is disjointed, with many areas of investigation resulting
in dead-ends, the use of sequential completion contracts
for each segment of the developmental effort again would
result in a very lengthy process. f39)
Under the WAC concept, the master contract would be
issued requiring a certain level of effort be performed towards
the development of a new rocket motor. The specific areas of
investigation would be performed under individual WA's. As
new approaches are discovered, new WA's are issued for their
study, while WA's are cancelled for areas of research found
to be fruitless. Turning the contractor on and off becomes
an administrative simple task, relative to the issuance of
individual contracts.
4. Special Considerations
The user, in recommending a specific contract type,
and the Contracting Officer, in making the determination,
must ensure that the conditions for its use are met if a
WAC is considered. This would be true for any contract type.
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The Government's objective in choosing a contract type is
generally to have the contractor bear the risk of perfor-
mance. [j7:225J That is, issue the contract for a specific
product, or period of performance in the case of a service
contract, and remain at arms length for the duration. The
contractor is expected to make all decisions during perfor-
mance unless normal Government surveillance dictates inter-
ventions. During a developmental program's evolution, however,
technical managers indicate that it is often not desirable
for a contractor to decide the most expedient approach to take
when the wasting of taxpayer dollars is a potential result.
Redirection becomes the norm rather than the exception, as
evidenced in those contracts researched.
For this reason, the use of the WAC to eliminate mid-
contract redirection is considered by interviewees to be
highly desirable. Many programs are sequential in most
part and subsequent studies will depend upon or be a function
of previous studies. Without the ability to technically evaluate
the study efforts and to direct subsequent lines of inquiry,
the Government's position in the overall progress of the
program is significantly impaired.
In considering the various factors which constitute
the basis for determination of contract type, the following
are pertinent in most developmental programs: Q4:H-l]
(a) The type and complexity of the item.
(b) The stability of the design.
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(c) The firmness/specificity of the technical
specification package.
(d) Relevant historical pricing data.
(e) Prior experience in similar development efforts.
Research indicates that all of the above factors, when
applied to a major hardware development program indicate that
a flexible contract vehicle is required.
In the case of a WAC for R&D services, users point
out that one of the key considerations is the appointment of
the Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR).
As was addressed previously, many service WAC's are designed
for a multi-user environment. Services such as test data
analysis, maintainability studies, etc., could conceivably
be required by nearly every department at a major R&D shore
installation. In order to ensure that all WA's issued to
the contractor are formated properly and contain the required
level of technical specificity, they are normally screened
by an individual who acts as the COTR. According to field
personnel interviewed, the COTR must be capable of establishing
priorities among all work sent to the contractor, must be able
to interface well with both the users and the contractor per-
sonnel, and must command a high enough level of respect from
the Command that support is provided in settling inter-
departmental disputes. The COTR works closely with the
contracts personnel in the administration of the contract,
and in the case of a CPAP contract, normally chairs the
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evaluation board. Some specific problems relating to the
COTR concept will be addressed in Chapter VI.
A final consideration which the Contracting Officer
must address is the level of control imposed upon the ordering
officer and COTR regarding such factors as WA/TO format, re-
view and approval levels, contractor proposal evaluation,
and final approval dollar limitations. NAVSUP has issued a
very lengthy instruction, detailing on a universal basis
many of these controls. An example is that all WA's/TO's
over $50,000 must be approved by the Contracting Officer
prior to issuance to the contractor. This instruction is
addressed in greater detail in Chapter VI.
5. Mission Essentiality
The WAC as it is used today by the R&D community is
considered by both technical and contracting personnel to
be a critical asset to successful program completion. Senior
level technical personnel emphasize that both the services
and hardware development areas require a great deal of flexi-
bility in R&D acquisitions. Sponsor requests are sporadic
and time-constrained. To maintain a high level of professional
credibility, the engineering community must have access to a
contractual form which provides them this requisite flexi-
bility. Additionally, the cost-control necessary in austere
budget years is facilitated by contracts which can be quickly
turned off or on.
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The key benefit of a WAC from the perspective of the
contracting community researched is the timeliness with which
WA's and TO's can be issued when compared with individual
procurements of similar dollar value. The research shows
that a typical $50,000 contract (CPPP) takes between 50 and
60 days to award. A similar effort, issued on a WA takes
between 10 and 15 days, much of this being mail time for
obtaining the contractor's signature. Emergency or highly
critical requirements can be processed in hours. The main
objective as perceived by lab contracting organization is
responsive service . The WAC is deemed by users to enable
the contract professionals to meet this objective while
still meeting the regulatory requirements.
B. CURRENT STATUS
While the WAC concept as just described has been in
operation for over a decade, it has only recently come under
criticism by the Naval Audit Service (NAS), Western Region;
criticism aimed at the basic instrument itself and the spe-
cific manner in which an individual laboratory was funding
work accomplished under a WAC. [ll| This research effort
was aimed primarily at the question of contract-type vice
funding difficulties. The options available and limitations




The WAC contracts researched and now in use "by the labora-
tories are generally of the cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) level
of effort (LOS) variety. They are written with a very broad
scope of work in Section E (Supplies/Services and Prices) of
the contract. In Section P ( Description/Specifications)
,
additional detail is used describing the various categories
of work to be performed. Sections E and P of a typical WAC,
along with an applicable individual Work Assignment appear
in Appendix B of this study. The key issue raised by the NAS
was that no work was required by the contractor upon signing
an executed contract. Only upon acceptance of the first Work
Assignment (WA) or Task Order (T)) was the contractor obli-
gated to perform. As such, the NAS contends that these con-
tracts are in reality no different than Basic Ordering Agreements
(BOA). The categorization of WAC's as BOA's however, subjects
the requiring or contracting personnel to the utilization of
WAC's in accordance with the DAR guidance on BOA's, i.e., each
requirement or new work package must be synopsized and procured
competitively, or sole source when appropriate.
C. PROBLEM ANALYSIS
Now that (1) the evolution of the WAC concept has been
presented, outlining the developers' rationale and percep-
tions as to the WAC's desirability and indeed essentiality
to the R&D contracting process, and (2) the current position
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taken by the Naval Audit Service (NAS) regarding the WAC's
illegality as presently used, an analysis of the Audit
Service alternatives is in order.
The specific recommendations offered by the NAS concerning
the inappropriate use of WAC's in R&D contracting were to
either convert the existing WAC's to BOA's or obtain a devia-
tion for each proposed use of a WAC in accordance with DAR
Section 3-401(a)(2). [llj Both of these recommendations,
while entirely appropriate within the existing regulatory
framework, fail to address the needs of users interviewed.
The situation perceived in the labs is that they have been
expected to conform their needs to existing contract types
rather than the converse situation of flexible guidance to
be applied to flexible needs.
Under a BOA, the R&D community researched would lose
the responsiveness required to meet program goals, since
each identifiable work package would be necessarily synop-
sized, competed when appropriate, and negotiated for award.
Laboratory managers interviewed expressed grave concern for
program continuity, schedule expansions, and the very basic
ability of the labs to perform their missions effectively.
The second NAS recommendation, to obtain a one-time devia-
tion in each instance wherein the contracting officer deter-
mines that a WAC is the only appropriate contract vehicle,
is perceived by field personnel as a needless administrative
burden, imposing unproductive demands in both headquarters
and field level personnel.
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The research found some limited support for the concept
of issuing indefinite quantity contracts with the schedule
calling for an estimated number of man hours of various
types, tied to a "broad scope of work in Section P of such
contracts. The researcher feels that this option is totally
inappropriate, since the amount of technical direction which
can be given under current DAR guidance would be limited
to minor clarifications or identification of task details,
such as test data to be analyzed. Enlarging technical direction
to include detailed task orders is not appropriate under the
current guidance.
WAC supporters in the field deem such use of an indefi-
nite quantity contract to be an insurmountable burden, since
in all cases wherein it would be used, a statement of work
extensive enough to guide even the most astute contractor
throughout performance of the specified estimated effort is
considered impossible to draft in advance of most of the
preliminary work in a typical R&D program. [_15j
The researcher considers it necessary to point out at
this juncture that proponents and users of the WAC contracts
have an obligation to the integrity of the G-overnment-contractor
relationship. This obligation involves a professional commit-
ment to provide technical direction only, and not assume the
role of managing the contractor and his workforce. Such a







The subject of appropriate levels of contracting
authority for the CNM Laboratories is not new. Since the
inception of the labs, a constant battle has been waged
between the laboratory personnel and the Naval Supply Systems
Command. [22] The net result to date is that some labs
have been successful in obtaining increased authority, while
others are still waging the battle. Table I depicts the
present levels of contracting authority for the CNM labs.
Table I















This issue addresses field level personnel's current
desires for a more comprehensive decision process in deter-
mining increased contracting authority for the Navy labs.
The key arguments in favor of decentralization of R&D contracting
authority are presented, as well as the counter arguments
by those who would preserve the integrity of the central
buying offices. Each argument is analyzed based upon the
research.
2. How Contracting Authority is Granted
All field purchasing activities (including the Navy
Laboratories) comprising the Navy Field Procurement System
are responsible to the Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command
(NAVSUP) for the proper performance of the purchase function
under his delegated contracting authority. As manager of the
Navy Field Procurement System, NAVSUP provides policy direction,
technical assistance, performance appraisal, contract planning,
and other aspects of functional management, including analysis
and evaluation of necessary contracting authority, capability,
staffing and training. In certain geographical areas, NAVSUP
exercises these management functions through Naval Regional
Contracts Offices (NRCO) or certain Supply Centers.
At the time the NRCO or area buying office concept
was established in 1967, the major problems confronting NAVSUP
were the management and control of over 200 purchasing activi-
ties. A renewed Congressional interest in small purchase
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effectiveness, limited travel funds for performing advijory
visits, and a diminshed headquarters staff led to the con-
cept of decentralization by geographic areas. The two primary
missions of the NRCO as originally stated are: £22]
• Major Contract Support with improved management,
better buyers through training, and a closer
relationship with the customer activities.
• Management responsibility for all purchase activity
within a geographic area.
Working within this regionally centralized framework,
contracting support for those labs not possessing unlimited
contracting authority is provided by the NRCO's. Requests
for increased authority are forwarded through the NRCO
involved to NAYSUP, who makes the determination. Oftentimes,
the CNM lab will forward the request via CNM for an endorse-
ment. NAYSUP utilizes an internally developed algorithm
(Appendix C) for deciding the appropriate level of contracting
authority. This algorithm takes into account such factors
as workload, proximity to a NRCO, productivity, and Procure-
ment Administrative Lead Time (PALT). Additionally, the
comments provided by the responsible NRCO, as well as the
criticality of the lab's business to the organizational
viability of the NRCO are scrutinized, flf] The NRCO com-
ments are generally in the form of an updated evaluation of




The present system utilized to determine the appropriate
level of contracting authority for laboratories is perceived
as deficient in two major areas by field personnel inter-
viewed. First, the real issues which need to be addressed
during such a determination process are considered to be
either not addressed or clouded by surface issues of dubious
validity. Secondly, the actual flow of the request and
review cycle leads to organization conflicts. These two
factors have, according to those laboratory personnel inter-
viewed operating with less than the desired level of con-
tracting authority, contributed to inefficiency in the
contracting process. The following analysis will examine
both of these areas, with particular emphasis on the merits
of the traditional arguments in favor of centralization,
when applied to CNM labs.
C. PROBLEM ANALYSIS
1. Centralization - A Question of Efficiency
Proponents of continued centralization of contracting
authority within the NRCO's and NSC's have used several
arguments. The most common is that only the central buying
offices possess the necessary trained expertise in contracting
personnel, and that due to a shortage of qualified contracting
specialists, newly established unlimited contracting offices
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would likely fail to acquire the requisite staff. In con-
trast, during the period 1974-1978, the Naval Weapons Center
has had its contracting authority increased in three stages
from $2500 to $100,000. Each incremental increase has meant
a need for more trained personnel. These required personnel
have been obtained without major difficulty, even in an
isolated area over 100 miles from civilization! Hence, the
laboratory manager can obtain qualified personnel if he is
committed to providing the resources to the contract area.
A second argument in favor of the central buying
offices is that they provide a high level of consistency
in policy implementation. Research has shown that while
total decentralization may result in a more fragmented imple-
mentation of policy, the retention of management control by
the regional offices could provide the desired continuity.
The regional offices could continue to issue instructions and
guidance to activities within their area even though a
laboratory might have unlimited contracting authority.
Prom an economics standpoint, centralization pro-
ponents suggest that the large buying offices are more cost
effective than smaller contracting shops dispersed throughout
the region. A duplication of management or supervisory per-
sonnel and staff support would be required for each office,
therefore centralization offers lower overall costs to the
Navy. £29] What are the costs of placing a contract? In
addition to the actual professional contracts personnel
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costs and related staff costs, research, has shown a signifi-
cant cost for high-grade engineering personnel on travel
to a regional buying office to clarify a statement of work
or negotiation position. Additionally, the costs of lost
lead time due to mail delays in processing the mountains of
paperwork are considered by field personnel to be critical.
The Naval Weapons Center in an informal analysis concluded
that it could process all actions over its current $100,000
threshold with two less billets than it was estimated that
NRCO long Beach was devoting to the effort.
Within most of the labs today, a senior level staff
of experienced GS-1102 contracting professionals exists to
provide a matrix form of support to the technical community.
Additionally, the necessary working level and management
talent is in place to review the large dollar expenditures
processed through the organization under WA's. Consequently,
the only real addition necessary in these cases would be
negotiators and counsel where not already on-site.
A final argument offered by centralization proponents
is that decentralizing through the granting of unlimited
authority to the labs would decimate the contracts divisions
of the regional offices, and possibly lead to the loss of
high grade military and civilian billets. While certain
regional offices, such as NRCO long Beach, would experience
a reduction in their contracts workload and a change in the
workload mix due to decentralization of contracting authority
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for the labs, the overall impact on the system would be
limited because the lab business as a percentage of the
buying offices' totals is relatively small. (22)
In addition to the above arguments in support of
centralization, the NAVSUP decision process examines another
factor. The endorsement by the NRCO on a request for increased
lab authority is used to measure the quality of the labs work.
These endorsements are based upon recent Contract Management
Reviews (CMR). laboratory personnel interviewed contend that
these CMR's are less than objective due to the NRCO's desires
to continue doing the labs' contracting.
With these surface issues being utilized in evaluating
contracting authority increase requests, several key issues
considered by the labs to be of critical importance are left
unaddressed.
2 . Decentralization - A Question of Responsiveness
The proponents of further decentralization, i.e.,
increased contracting authority for each of the Navy's RDT&E
laboratories have authored several arguments in support of
their position. Perhaps as background for these arguments,
five specific aspects of the role of the labs should be
identified: £l9 : 5J
a. Reservoir of technical expertise
b. Testing and experimentation
c. Fleet and in-service engineering
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d. Quick reaction capability in time of emergency
e. Interface between System Commands and industry
One of the major complaints heard from the labs
without unlimited authority was addressed by the Navy/Marine
Corps Acquisition Review Council in 1975:
"The most commonly voiced complaint heard throughout the
R&D/Acquisition community is the widespread decoupling
of accountability, responsibility, and authority. In
other words, those who are accountable have insufficient
authority, and those who either have authority or are in
a position to influence strongly the successful prosecu-
tion of R&D/Acquisition programs (staffs) have no account-
ability for success or failure." [22l
A laboratory Commander has a difficult job to accom-
plish in a highly competitive environment. Since most labora-
tory work is done at the request of sponsors, successful and
cost effective performance is necessary to continue to receive
funding from these same sponsors. A surfeit of funds requires
contracting with industry for goods and services, since per-
sonnel ceiling restrictions limit the amount of work which
can be accomplished in-house. Thus, with future funds dependent
upon performance, flexibility to contract in a timely manner
becomes an abject necessity. A regional office, not account-
able to the laboratory Commander would doubtless fail to pro-
vide the level of flexibility that an in-house contracting
shop would provide. [14:9]
In 1971, the Task Group on Defense In-house Labora-
tories recommended that "military departments should give the
laboratory directors greater control over procurement. To
enable quicker reaction and responsiveness on the part of the
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Defense laboratories, their directors need higher monetary-
thresholds and streamlined procurement procedures. " Since
this recommendation was made eight years ago, there is no
evidence that action was taken to grant laboratories
sufficient control over the contracting process. \2%\
Up to this point the arguments for decentralizing
R&D contracting authority have been such that most any ambi-
tious field activity desiring an increase in authority could
use them — more responsiveness, quicker reaction capability
and accountability. Setting these aside, however, the true
issue can be addressed. The NRCO emphasis, as can be shown
by examining the statistical summaries produced for each office,
continues to be purchasing or buying. The primary customers
are fleet or fleet support activities, e.g., ships, shipyards
and air stations. The principal items purchased are spare
parts, non-standard commercially available pieces of equipment,
and routine services for base support. Negotiation Exception 11
(experimental, developmental or research work) is used very
little, as are cost-type contracts. The exceptions to this
generalization are the NRCO ! s which serve Navy labs with
limited authority. Laboratory contracting is intrinsically
different from volume buying. R&D is a unique process which
seeks to develop the necessary technological base in order to
provide the Navy with high quality weaponry in a timely manner
at a reasonable cost. The labs' missions can only be accom-
plished through a special military-industrial technological
effort involving close and continual cooperation between
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engineering, contracting and industry personnel. A large
portion of incoming dollars to the labs goes toward explora-
tory, advanced and engineering development utilizing the
complete range of contract types from firm-fixed price (FPP)
to cost plus fixed fee (CPPF). This very sophisticated and
complex acquisition process and contracting cycle reaches
its peak of efficiency when both G-overnment and industry
engineers and scientists have direct access to and continual
interface with a highly trained and motivated contracting
staff in close proximity. A large NRCO organization, with
no accountability to the laboratory Commander, often located
over 100 miles from the labs, cannot provide the effective
third party essential to the success of the contractural
effort. [l§J
While the research found counterpoints to the tradi-
tional arguments in favor of centralized contracting authority,
no counterpoints were identified as detracting from the argu-
ments in favor of decentralization of lab authority.
3. Organizational Conflict
a. Navy Regional Contracting Office Evaluations
As addressed in the preceding paragraphs, the
credibility of the responsible NRCO's evaluation of the per-
formance of a given lab is considered questionable by labora-
tory personnel. As a result of a recent request for increased
authority at NWC, NRCO long Beach performed a Contract Manage-
ment Review (CMR) of the NWC contracting operation. [32J As
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alleged in NWC's response to the CMR findings, a professional,
complete and unbiased review was not conducted. f3o] NWC
identified numerous instances of unsubstantiated findings.
It is unfortunate that this situation occurred, however,
research has shown it not all too surprising given the moti-
vations of the organization involved.
b. Chief of Naval Material vs. Naval Supply Systems
Command
As noted in Chapter II, there is a unique relation-
ship between CNM and NAVSUP in the area of contracting policy
and laboratory management. While CNM has the responsibility
for the overall performance of the labs, the fact that NAVSUP,
a subordinate command to CNM, controls the contracting portions
provides an interesting situation. It would appear from the
research that with a very vocal laboratory management clamoring
for decentralization to CNM management, specific direction
could be given to NAVSUP to act favorably on these requests.
However, such has not been the case in the past. £4J NAVSUP'
s




Within the laboratory environment, the overwhelming
opinion of the technical managers is that the contracting
process takes too long to accomplish and is overburdened with
unnecessary review requirements. To be more specific, there
are three primary areas wherein significant delays occur at
the expense of program progress: (1) the actual Procurement
Request Preparation (PRP) process, (2) the requirement to
document proposed sole source or limited source procurements
over $500, and (3) the requirement for the Secretary's approval
on procurements over $100,000 using negotiation Exception 11.
Each of these subjects will be dealt with separately.
A. PROCUREMENT REQUEST PREPARATION PROCESS
1. Background
As with any bureaucratic organization, the Navy has
established many standard procedures or rules by which operating
personnel must conduct their work. The goal is uniformity,
however the frustrations experienced by a field level manager
when dealing with the maze of instructions, notices, directives,
laws, memos and general policy statements often cause that
manager to lose sight of the redeeming features of this goal.
The extent of these procedural requirements can best be illus-
trated by examining the published procurement guidelines of a
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major lab. In the section on Procurement Milestones next
to the PRP portion of the contracting cycle, the time necessary
is given as a question mark. |j54:l-6j Some examples of the
various review, approvals or determinations which must be
made are:
(a) Contract Data Requirements
(b) Sole Source Statements
(c) Urgency Statement/Justification
(d) Contract Security Classification Specifications
(e) Buy American Act Exemption
(f) Automatic Data Processing Equipment Review
(g) Photographic Material
The above list, of course, does not include the prepara-
tion of the statement of work, the evaluation plan, or many
other time consuming efforts. The list seems endless to many
frustrated engineers who have little or no training in the
contracting process, and thereby interpret it as being a
hindrance to their work.
2. Current Status
The extent of reviews and procedures impacting a
requiring activity or individual during the PRP phase is
not likely to diminish. Therefore, in analyzing the problem,
one must examine means to increase the efficiency of both the




In any organization employing technical talent,
there is some administrative effort which each technician
or engineer must accomplish in order to keep the work flowing.
The key decision to be made by the manager is - how much?
When does the effectiveness of an engineer begin to be de-
graded? Pely and Andrews have concluded that within a labora-
tory environment, all technical personnel need to be exposed
to and involved in some administrative duties. In fact,
through extensive research in this area, these authors found
that technical people actually benefit from mild exposure to
such administrative tasks as sitting in on conferences or
review committee meetings. 11:88]
In the area of training, the technical individual
who is schooled in the contracting process is more apt to
understand the reasons for many of the PRP reviews, and may
therefore, be less likely to berate them. £21/ This
schooling can take many forms. Contracting for Technical
Personnel is considered by attendees as an excellent course
conducted on site in many locations throughout DOD. This
course provides the basics of contracting in a condensed
format. Another avenue to pursue for contracting knowledge
is the internal guidelines many laboratories have prepared
for just such personnel. A third avenue would be DOD spon-
sored correspondence courses in contracting. The technical
manager's choices in the area of personnel efficiency are
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varied, each involving a trade-off between the amount of
productive time doing technical work and the amount of pro-
ductive time doing administrative work.
The efficiency of the procedural or review PRP system
is a function of sources both external to an organization
and internal. As stated earlier, the likelihood of reductions
in externally imposed restrictions is not great, in view of
increased demands that the Government conduct its business
fairly. That leaves laboratory managers the internally imposed
restrictions to deal with.
Various labs use one of two systems to accomplish the
PRP effort. First, any individual who has identified a require-
ment is tasked with completing all the necessary steps in the
PRP cycle for that requirement. This effort may or may not
involve the assistance of a contracting professional from the
in-house contracting office. The benefit to this system is
that this individual is most likely to be conversant with
the nuances of the requirement; therefore, any question
arising during the PRP cycle can be answered expeditiously.
The disadvantage to this system is that the PRP processing
consumes time which the engineer might otherwise spend on
technically productive efforts. A second system utilized
involves establishing a PRP office within each major component
of the lab. As requirements are identified, this office is
responsible for the PRP procedures, drawing on the engineer
only as required to clarify elements in the specification.
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While this system enables the engineer to devote their
time to technical work, it does require "billets to be
sacrificed form the technical areas to staff the PRP office.
B. COMPETITION
One of the underlying reasons for the issuance of 0MB
Circular A-109 was the perceived need to establish a compe-
titive environment earlier in the major systems acquisition
cycle. £37) This section deals with the issue of competi-
tive versus non-competitive contracting in the earliest phase
of the acquisition cycle, Mission Area Analysis. It is
during this phase that while intelligence personnel and
strategists are assessing enemy threats, Government labora-
tories working with industry are conducting basic research
and development aimed at increasing the technological
base, or the limited designing of specific hardware to meet
a specific need. During the research effort for this thesis,
it became apparent that there is a great deal of importance
of this issue to a significant number of technical personnel
whose responsibilities are to expand the technological base
so that future needs can be met with proven concepts. The
context of this issue is limited to those contracts negotiated
pursuant to Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR) 3-211, and




a. What is Research and Development?
In order to provide a proper framework for the
ensuing discussion, it is first necessary to establish the
specific definition of Research and Development (R&D) as it
will be used. The term R&D means that research effort con-
ducted by the technical personnel in Government laboratories
aimed at either furthering man's basic knowledge or applying
existing knowledge to the solution of an existing or antici-
pated need. It also includes development effort aimed at the
solution of a specific military problem. |j:10j| This R&D
effort may range in practical terms from the complicated
research regarding optical coatings on laser windows to the
development or testing of a new type of gyroscope. A key
factor is that the effort is independent of a major system
acquisition at this point. Another key factor is that the
Government laboratories rely on industry for a major portion
of this R&D effort due to both billet and talent limitations
within the Department of Defense.
b. Independent R&D Contributions
DOD Directive 5100.66 establishes the policy for
and the technical evaluation of Independent R&D programs
conducted by industry using their own internal resources.
The following passages are quoted from that directive:
IR&D.
. .
is recognized by the DOD as a necessary cost
of doing business in a high technology environment. Through
support, consistent with the cost principles established in
ASPR, of contractors' IR&D . . . programs, DOD seeks to:
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•Assure creation of an environment which encourages
development of innovative concepts for Defense systems
and equipment which complement and "broaden the spectrum
of concepts developed internally to DOD.
•Develop technical competence in two or more contractors
who can then respond competitively to any one requirement
DOD seeks from industry.
•Contribute as appropriate to the economic stability of
its contractors by allowing each contractor the technical
latitude to develop a broad base of technical products. [5:5]
IR&D is recognized as a critical cog in the
defense acquisition cycle. The technical breakthroughs
resulting from IR&D efforts subsidized by DOD not only con-
tribute to the technology base, but they also afford DOD the
opportunity to competitively procure systems as required.
c. On the Issue of Competition
The nation's military security, as well as its
broader overall economic foundations are based upon the
principles of a competitive free enterprise system. Advancing
the technology base efficiently,- transforming this technology
into end-item capabilities superior in performance and cost
to those of our adversaries, is a function of these competi-
tive forces. It has been recognized explicitly that it is
conscious national policy that "DOD rely primarily on compe-
tition to select sources for developing and producing its
military hardware ..." |_5 : 4j
Given the overall national policy that our defense
contracting be based on competition, what issues complicate
this policy? What factors lead to inefficiencies in the
competitive contracting cycle? What factors dilute the
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value of the product received as a result of the competi-
tive contracting cycle? These and other questions shall be
addressed.
One of the major complicating factors in our
attempts to carry out the national policy on competition
is the very nature of the R&D effort. As addressed in
Chapter II, the types of firms who possess the capabilities
necessary to respond to solicitations of the R&D nature this
issue addresses are very limited. Specialized testing facili-
ties, highly specialized talent in personnel, and management
commitment to the pursuit of technology are all necessary
prerequisites. In a study performed by the Rand Corporation
for the Defense Logistics Institute, it was found that R&D
is largely non-competitive. The authors further stated
that, "the barriers to competition here are so severe that
the prospects for significant increases in price rivalry are
not encouraging." (l3:12j
To this point then there seems to exist a contra-
diction between the spirit of the law as set forth in national
policy and the realities present in the R&D environment, i.e.,
obtain maximum competition in an arena recognized as being
highly unsusceptible to competitive forces.
2. Current Status
As part of their overall mission, Navy laboratories
are responsible for either developing internally or funding
industry through IR&D to develop the technological base
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necessary to meet our defense needs. Once it is recognized
that the in-house capability does not exist, either through
billet constraints or lack of specialized talent facilities,
the determination is made to rely on industry. As used in
this context, industry includes not only the normal profit
motivated firm, but also the non-profit research centers
such as those associated with some of the major universities
in the U. S.
Working closely with contracting personnel, the
engineers first develop a meaningful statement of work within
which the contractor must perform. Due to the often ambiguous
nature of the research effort, this process can take weeks
in view of the numerous commitments the technical people
face. [2l]
It is at this point that a major dilemma appears;
a dilemma resulting from one of two possible sources. First,
the technical effort contemplated could very well be the result
of an unsolicited proposal from industry, or if it is an
in-house idea, the technical community could desire a sole-
source contract even though another firm may have the minimum
capabilities to perform.
Unsolicited proposals as defined in DAB. 4-900 are the
product of original thinking, are submitted by industry with-
out prior solicitation from the Government, and in order to
be contracted for, must be shown conclusively to be available
from no other source. While in many cases it is not difficult
to substantiate the third requirement, for instance due to
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highly specialized testing facilities required, in many other
cases the effort could be performed by two or more firms.
The engineer responsible for the project must, according to
DAE, substantiate the sole-source nature in order for the
Contracting Officer to make the sole-source determination
required. The IR&D effort described earlier is the major
source of unsolicited proposals. Highly concentrated defense
firms are continually developing potential military appli-
cations for concepts or technology they achieve through inde-
pendent research.
The second source of this dilemma is a product of
another key responsibility of the technical personnel in
laboratories. During many conversations with project super-
visors and working engineers, it was learned that they spend
a great deal of time reviewing hundreds of technical periodi-
cals or other literature in order to stay abreast of new
developments. As a result of this review process, many
engineers have very strong opinions regarding the "leaders"
in industry - who is doing what, who is the most advanced,
who has made certain breakthroughs? Consequently, when a
requirement is identified, in order to preserve the integrity
of the concept, the engineer desires that the most competent
firm be awarded the contract, not just the lowest priced firm
among all who meet the minimum requirements.
In order to resolve the problem at this stage, a popu-
lar, if not the only solution, is to develop a fair set of
evaluation criteria to be used in reviewing the responses to
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the solicitation released to industry. Since the major
goal of the proposed effort is to prove a technological
concept or principle, nearly all of these evaluation systems
are designed with cost as being of negligible importance,
while the technical capabilities demonstrated or offered
by the firms are of paramount importance.
According to informal standards recognized by one
major Navy laboratory, this evaluation process takes an
average of two man-weeks. The time spent on the actual
evaluation is in the neighborhood of 20-30 hours; however,
again many other commitments prevent full-time attention to
the evaluation. Upon completion of this technical evalua-
tion, the proposals and their respective technical scores
are forwarded to the Contracting Officer for review.
Research has shown that due to the highly technical
nature of these types of procurements, nearly all of them are
suitable for only Cost Plus Fixed Pee (CPFP) contracts. The
uncertainties are great, the specification or statement of
work is not well defined, and the contractors are unwilling
to accept the risk associated with any other contract type.
Consequently, once the Contracting Officer has identified
those firms in the competitive range, there is very little
analysis necessary to establish the reasonableness of the
proposed cost. Typically, the numbers of labor hours pro-
posed by the contractor(s) are reviewed by the engineer,
the labor and overhead rates proposed by the contractor(s)
are verified with the Defense Contract Audit Agency (LCAA),
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and the Weighted Guidelines or other technique is used to
determine an appropriate fee amount. Negotiations are
generally limited to the fee area, and contract award is
made. It should be noted that if the proposed contractor
is a non-profit educational institution, no fee is paid.
During the term of these types of contracts, the
contractor is reimbursed for all costs that are determined
to be allowable and allocable. Upon completion of the spe-
cified effort, the fixed fee is paid where applicable,
with the Government receiving the results required by the
statement of work.
3. Problem Analysis
At this point, one might ask how this apparently
smooth functioning process could be improved. When examined
in detail, the answers may become clearer. For purposes of
this analysis, assume that the restrictions on sole-source
contracting were lifted entirely on procurements such as
these. What benefits would accrue to the Government, and
what disadvantages would appear?
a. Benefits
Pox recognized four factors which make such
non-competitive or single source procurements more desirable
than competitive procurements. [7 : 256J
First, the most valuable resource (and the most
costly to the taxpayer) which the laboratories possess is the
personnel with their talents and high level of experience.
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Outside of the Washington, D. C. area, it is recognized
that the various R&D laboratories are staffed with some
of the most competent individuals in Government circles.
This situation is attested to by the number of personnel
who transfer between the labs and the major commands in
Washington. To place demands upon the time of these person-
nel in light of limited benefits is not cost-effective. To
process a competitive procurement requires more time on the
part of the technical personnel, to ensure that work state-
ments are written carefully and can be interpreted equally
by all interested firms. Once the proposals are received,
the previously mentioned evaluation process must be under-
taken to examine the particular strengths and weaknesses
of each offeror in order to determine the best qualified,
all factors considered.
Second, Fox contends that competitive contracting
increases the likelihood of protests and disputes from dis-
gruntled contractors. In view of this possibility, contracting
personnel interviewed agree that extra care must be taken by
all personnel involved in the competitive procurement process
to ensure that fairness is established and maintained. In-
quiries from Congress of other contractors must be responded
to with fully supportable information regarding decisions
made.
Third, the relationship built up between Govern-
ment and industry technical personnel can become strained
in the face of competitive contracting. As addressed earlier,
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Government technical personnel are continually in contact
with industry counterparts, discussing the technical progress
enjoyed. By forcing competition, the system tends to break
down these relationships, thereby possibly leading to a
reluctance for industry personnel to discuss or transmit
technical information which could be of value.
The final point made by Fox does not have a great
deal of bearing on the specific R&D contracts being addressed
here; however, there is some applicability. He contends that
the competitive process involves an evaluation of the offerors,
often leading to an award to the low-cost contractor. Prob-
lems of quality and reliability can then surface, requiring
the buying organization to explain them to higher authority.
During the evaluation of offers in an R&D program, subjective
judgements are being made. If an erroneous judgement results
in a less than qualified contractor being selected for research
in an important area, the ramifications can be long delays,
wasted money, or an inadequate product.
Fox's first point must be expanded somewhat in
view of recent directives from the Chief of Naval Material
(CNM). Recently, CNM has issued a series of instructions on
the topic of Contractor Support Services. The impetus behind
these instructions was a lack of control of both the con-
tracting process and the contractor's performance on these
types of procurements. A common problem as characterized by
CNM was a lack of sufficient monitoring of the contractor's
performance to ensure that the Government was receiving a
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fair return on its investment. Many of these contracts
were multi-million dollar, requiring non-personal services
to be performed either on or off Government property.
Inherent in any solution to the problems addressed was the
need for more man-hours to be devoted to contractor sur-
veillance, contract review and technical evaluation. By
reducing the amount of time taken up by low dollar R&D
procurements, more engineer and Contracting Officer time could
be devoted to these high-impact, high-cost contracts.
Another advantage seen by laboratory technical
and contracting personnel in a relaxation of the restrictions
on single-source procurements is the possible increase in
the number of unsolicited proposals from industry resulting
from IR&D effort. If industry were to be assured that all
technically valid proposals could be processed quickly with-
out the limitations now present to justify sole-source,
they may feel more open in submitting such proposals. Billet
drawdowns as experienced and proposed recently within DOD will
require a greater reliance on industry. Any reasonable charges
which would encourage industry to actively pursue technology
advancement would compensate in some measure for the reduc-
tions in Government capabilities.
With regard to the Contracting Officer f s involve-
ment in this process, two improvements are seen in a relaxa-
tion of the single-source documentation requirements or the
competitive selection process requirements. As indicated
earlier, the time necessary for all competing offerors to
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evaluate and respond to a solicitation is agreed to be about
30 days, except under legitimate cases of urgency. It is
doubtful if the highly-qualified, expert-in-the-field contractor
would require as much time. In fact, most sole-source con-
tractors in R&D have no trouble responding to solicitations
within 15 days, based upon the researcher's observations.
This time savings, coupled with the elimination of the file
documentation requirements, would enable the laboratory con-
tracting organization to increase their overall efficiency,
b. Drawbacks
The foremost drawback to such a revision to
policy on single-source contracting is the possibility of
favoritism that may develop between certain Government per-
sonnel and contractors. If restrictions were lifted, elimi-
nating the need for documented single-source decisions,
charges could be levied that other fully capable contractors
would be precluded from demonstrating their own expertise.
In order to eliminate this fear, the integrity and professional
competence of the Government engineers and contracting per-
sonnel must be relied upon. As a further precaution, Govern-
ment contracting personnel would have to continue their close
scrutiny of work statements and actual contractual results.
The researcher's experience has been that laboratory personnel
are thoroughly professional with very few exceptions. It is
an unpleasant observation that with or without restrictions
in any system there will be a select few who choose to place
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personal gain or program completion over the integrity of
the system as a whole.
If one is to accept the generally understood
belief that competition reduces procurement expenditures by
approximately 25%, fj : 256J then one might assume that
relaxing non-competitive restrictions would lead to higher
costs in the R&D arena. The researcher believes this would
not be the case. Given that nearly all of these contracts
are CPFF, that the most technically competent firms would
be chosen and that their reputation within DOD would be on
the line, so to speak, £12:7] the final costs and fee paid
would be within close proximity to those paid to a competi-
tively chosen firm. In fact, they may be lower due to possi-
ble efficiencies possessed by the industry leaders.
C. SECRETARIAL DETERMINATIONS AND FINDINGS
1. Background
All procurement within DOD must be accomplished by
Formal Advertising (FA) unless the circumstances of the pro-
curement justify the use of one of the seventeen exceptions
permitting negotiation. These exceptions are clearly defined
in 10 U. S. C. 2304(a). Exception (11), Experimental, develop-
mental, or research work is used quite commonly within the
laboratory community, as one might expect. As addressed pre-
viously, the number of highly qualified contractors available
for R&D work is generally limited due to the unique skills
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and facilities required. Additionally, costs are much less
definable at the inception, leading in most cases to a cost
reimbursement contract. Since cost contracts are precluded
under FA, R&D work must be negotiated. (2:108)
For many of the seventeen exceptions, including (11),
the contracting officer must make a Determination and Findings
(D&F) in writing that the work to be performed is not appro-
priate for FA. Additionally, several of the exceptions (11)
through (16) require the Secretary's approval on the D&F
prior to solicitation.
2. Current Status
Prior to passage of Public Law 87-653 in 1962, the
requirement for a Secretarial D&F when contemplating the
use of Exception (11) for R&D had no monetary limitations.
All actions involving Exception (11) had to be processed
through the Secretary. However, due to the growing use of
R&D within DOD, PL87-653 established a threshold of $100,000,
below which the Secretary's approval was not required. f2 : 1091
While this change provided some relief to both field level
personnel and personnel in the Secretary's office, continued
use of Exception (11) has amplified the administrative burden.
3. Problem Analysis
A review by the researcher of the awards made during
FY 79 by the labs, or NRCO's supporting the labs, shows a
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substantial number of Exception (11) D&F's required. In
fact, one individual contacted in the Secretary's office
devotes the majority of his time to reviewing D&F's. The
administrative lead time necessary for the forwarding of the
D&F from the contracting officer to the Secretary, via CNM,
adds a delay to the overall processing of these contracts
as evidenced by one NRCO's contracting milestone chart indi-
cating that seven to sixty days should be allowed for this
purpose. Discussions with field personnel indicated that
sixty days may be the average time. In fact, one instance
was cited wherein the delay was five months - allegedly due
to the approving official's reluctance to sign until confirmed
in his new position. Q.5]
The Commission on Government Procurement recommended
that this requirement for a Secretarial D&F be eliminated.
"We did not find a single instance where a D&F with respect
to R&D was disapproved because use of negotiation was not
considered appropriate. The present statutory requirement
to justify the use of negotiation results in many unneces-
sary and perfunctory exercises." [28:2|j
Senate Bill S.5 eliminates this requirement as a result of
the Commission's recommendation. [40J
One method the field level personnel have used when
available to expedite the process is to forward the D&F for
approval at the the time the requirement is initially identi-
fied. While the D&F is cycled through the administrative
chain, the balance of the PRP process is undertaken. In this
manner, lost time is kept to a minimum. It is an unfortunate
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reflection on the system however, when methods must be





This issue addresses the general subject of services
contract management by examining the requirements for such
activity by engineering personnel, the reactions of techni-
cal managers to these requirements, and an analysis of both
the merits of the requirements and the legitimacy of the
technical personnel's reactions.
A. BACKGROUND
In recent years, various surveys have been conducted
which have uniformally determined that the extent and quality
of monitoring contractors performing under service contracts
have been deficient. [27] Many of these contracts were of
the WAC variety as discussed in Chapter III. The particular
deficiencies noted have included, (1) lack of familiarization
by technical personnel regarding their duties, (2) insuffi-
cient time devoted to ensure that contractors are employing
efficient methods, (3) lack of attention during the invoicing
process to ensure that fair value was received for payments
made, and (4) blatant disregard for established procedures
often resulting in indictments and criminal convictions. fl7j
In response to a perceived need, NAVSUP issued NAVSUPINST
4330.6 on 29 December 1977. This instruction set forth
specific procedures to be used in the management of services
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contracts wherein task orders (TO), Work Assignments (WA)
or Delivery Orders (DO) are issued by requiring activity
personnel as delegated by the Procuring Contracting Offi-
cer (PCO).
The specific action paragraphs included in this
instruction address:
•The qualifications of the ordering officer
appointed by the PCO.
•The contents of WA's/TO's/DO's issued.
•The specific duties of an ordering officer.
•The specific duties of the Contracting Offi-
cer's Technical Representative (COTR).
•Controls by PCO governing the ordering process.
Appendix D lists the duties assigned to the technical repre-
sentative within the requiring activity. A cursory perusal
of these duties would lead one to conclude that the moni-
toring of a service contract within the R&D arena would prove
to be a full time responsibility, and in fact, the general
reaction of the technical community upon issuance of this
instruction was predictably vocal. In addition to complaints
regarding the duties themselves, the requirement for each
prospective COTR to attend a training or indoctrination
seminar was the subject of strong objection.
B. CURRENT STATUS
During the interview portion of this research, it was
learned that much of the initial negative reaction to the
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requirements of the NAVSUP instruction has waned. Closer
examination of the duties, with concurrent examination of
the work already being performed by requiring activity
technical personnel, have resulted in many engineers con-
cluding that the instruction's requirements are more palat-
able. There still exists, however, a pervasive feeling
among technical managers that their responsibilities as
COTR's in the area of contract management are too great, that
the contracting hierarchy is not attuned to their sensitivi-
ties, and that they were not hired or trained to be contract
administrators.
C. PROBLEM ANALYSIS
The Navy R&D community is not unique in its being cast
as ineffective in performance of COTR duties. The Army Audit
Agency has also found widespread deficiencies in how the
Army's COR's perform. The Army's findings go on to say that
there are no U. S. Army policies concerning the selection,
use, orientation and training of Army personnel monitoring
service contract perfromance. [6:9j While Domasinsky con-
cluded that the DAR guidance on service contract administra-
tion was profoundly deficient [6:40j, ^e Navy, with the
issuance of NAVSUPINST 4330.6 has established guidance.. The
question now becomes - is the instruction too explicit? Does
it allow the requisite flexibility for the PCO to properly
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determine the amount of authority to be delegated to a COTR?
The general opinion of the senior managers within the lab
community is that too much has been specified, that controls
have been levied on the process which hinder the effective
use of WAC's. (3J
In those laboratories staffed with a professional con-
tracting office, including G-S-12 level contract specialists
performing the ordering function on WAC's, the researcher
believes that the NAVSUP instruction does limit the requiring
activity's flexibility by requiring a PCO review of all pro-
posed WA's over $50,000, An alternative general form of
guidance could have been provided to the PCO's, tasking
them with instituting whatever controls are needed to ensure
that requiring activities ordering officers and COTR's dis-
charge their duties in a responsible manner.
In response to those technical personnel who persist in
their belief that the COTR duties are too all-encompassing -
that their responsibilities in the area of contract manage-
ment are outside the proper scope of their work assignments,
one must examine the record. Of the indictments brought in
recent months in the area of improper use of contractors,
not one individual has been in a contracting office. L18J
Users, requiring activity technical personnel and other
individuals in the ordering, and receiving portions of the
cycle have been cited. Additionally, as both the Navy Audit
Service and Army Audit service conclude, the technical community






There presently exists no suitable authorized con-
tract type for the successful accomplishment of the R&D
mission as pursued by the CNM labs. Research has shown
that the use of BOA's is inappropriate due to the require-
ment that each new work package must be treated administra-
tively as a new procurement; thus, breaking the desired
continuity of an R&D program. Obtaining one-time deviations
from DAR for each proposed new contract is also administra-
tively burdensome. The research has shown that the Work
Assignment Contract is uniquely suited to the R&D arena in
view of its inherent flexibility.
2. Recommendation
The Chief of Naval Material (CNM) should take the
appropriate steps for the establishment of a new contract
type in DAR - the Work Assignment Contract, to be authorized
exclusively in the R&D arena. Without such a contract vehicle,
the R&D contracting process will be ineffective in meeting
the traditional objectives of a typical R&D program. CNM
should enlist the support of the Navy's DAR council
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representative, other service representation, and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (Acquisi-
tion Policy) in implementing this recommendation.
B. CONTRACTING AUTHORITY
1. Conclusion
The specific missions and responsibilities of the labs are
not accounted for during the NAVSUP decision process regarding
contracting authority. Research has shown that using the
standard algorithm does not recognize the unique requirements
of the labs, and that the traditional arguments in favor of
centralized contracting are of questionable merit. Costs are
not necessarily increased, trained personnel can be acquired,
and consistent policy flow can be present with decentralized
contracting authority in the CNM labs.
2. Recommendation
NAVSUP should examine the R&D contracting needs more
closely during its contracting authority decision process.
The need for responsive, accountable support in laboratory
contracting should be included as a subjective determination
of contracting authority, rather than a rigid adherance to
the principles of centralization. NAVSUP should work closely
with the CNM technical community in reviewing the require-





The organizational conflict between CNM and NAVSUP
leads to a perceived lack of CNM support in conduction with
field level contracting authority issues. Laboratory managers
sense a failure by CNM to articulate the labs' needs when a
question of contracting authority is raised. Research shows
that this perception is not without foundation, since authority
increases are not supported strongly by CNM.
4. Recommendation
CNM should establish a firm policy on the contracting
authority requirements of the labs, and articulate that policy
to NAVSUP for consideration when reviewing authority requests.
Only in this manner will NAVSUP have clear directions from
CNM. In addition, specific requests routed through CNM
should be reinforced by CNM with a substantial endorsement.
5. Conclusion
Utilizing the responsible NRCO to evaluate a lab's
effectiveness during the contracting authority decision pro-
cess is inappropriate in view of the NRCO's vested interests.
With its own survival in the balance, evidence shows that
the regional office is not totally objective in its evalua-
tions, therefore, the evaluation loses its effectiveness as




Contract Management Reviews conducted incidental to
contracting authority increase requests should be performed
"by NAVSUP or the Inspector General. This is necessary to
ensure the objectivity essential to such a critical decision.
C. RESTRICTING FRAMEWORK
1. Conclusion
Laboratory managers have seen the effectiveness of
their technical personnel assets erode as the result of their
involvement in the Procurement Request Preparation (PRP)
process. This is characterized by the labs experiencing
an increasing number of technical personnel devoted to the
PRP process, vice actual bench work. Additionally, the over-
all contracting knowledge level of technical personnel was
found to be deficient, thus leading to inefficiency in that
time spent on the PRP process.
2. Recommendation
Recognizing that the quality of a contract flows
logically from the quality of the procurement request, lab
managers must each reassess their own organizations to deter-
mine how best to comply with the myriad of requirements in
the PRP process. Additionally, in formulating an organiza-
tional component with PRP responsibility, the lab manager
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must recognize the importance of training in the contract
area. Research evidence shows that highly trained, dedi-
cated personnel can serve as a positive force in reducing
the amount of time spent during the PRP process.
3. Conclusion
The restrictions on sole-source negotiated (Exception
11) procurements are of questionable benefit. Research shows
that the unique nature of R&D requirements and the industrial
base supplying them do not lend themselves to competitive
contracting. In fact, fewer than one-quarter of such require-
ments under $100,000 were processed competitively during FY 79.
4. Recommendation
The requirement to extensively document a non-competitive
R&D procurement under $100,000 should be eliminated. These
requirements and the R&D industry are not generally suited
to competition, and the documenting of sole-source is a
troublesome administrative burden. Lifting the requirement
will allow a much smoother flow of the requirements and
reduce the administrative burden on both the requiring activity
and the Contracting Officer. CNM should work with the DAR
Council and the Office of Federal Procurement Policy to obtain
a revision to Senate Bill S.5 to include this recommendation.
The researcher must caution contracting personnel to be dili-





The present requirement for Secretarial Determina-
tion and Findings (D&F) approved on R&D contracts over $100,000
is ineffective and administratively burdensome. Evidence from
research shows that not one D&F has ever been disapproved
because negotiation was inappropriate, and the the process
of approval takes an average of over sixty days.
6. Recommendation
CNM should work with the other services and the Office
of Federal Procurement Policy to obtain passage of Senate
Bill S.5, which eliminates the Secretarial D&F requirement.
Removal of the requirement will not degrade the quality of
the procurements, and it will lead to a more responsive con-
tracting cycle. Until such time as Senate Bill S.5 is passed,
CNM should work with the Secretary's Office to ensure that




Laboratory technical personnel and senior managers
do not appreciate the breadth and depth of their responsi-
bilities in the area of contract management. Consequently,
an ineffective level of performance pervades the administration
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of R&D services contracts. Naval Audit Service reviews
and Naval Supply Systems Command reviews have substantiated
this during recent field level examinations of the contract
administration function.
2. Re commendati on
CNM should strongly emphasize to senior laboratory
managers that their responsibilities as acquisition team
members are extensive. Effective technical involvement as
Contracting Officer's Technical Representatives (COTR's) is
imperative if contracts issued are to be properly administered.
The CNM contracting organization (08C) should delineate to
the technical managers the provisions of all pertinent
instructions and guidance. Additionally, MAT 08 should hold
laboratory managers accountable for the proper performance
of these duties during annual reviews of the labs' effective-
ness.
3. Conclusion
The NAVSTJP instruction regarding the administration
of services contracts is too specific to permit effective
field implementation at the labs, and is too restrictive in
its setting of controls on the process. Specifically, the
presence of experienced G-S-1102 contracting personnel at the
labs is not recognized, leading to controls which are aimed
at lesser staffed organizations. Additionally, the specific
steps in processing a Task Order or Work Assignment are
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delineated, giving neither the contracting officer nor the
requiring activity any degree of meaningful flexibility.
4. Recommendation
NAVSUP should revise NAVSUPINST 4330.6 to allow more
discretion by the Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) in
determining the controls and procedures necessary for
individual requiring activities. This would reward pro-
fessionally competent contracting officers with fewer con-
trols, while enabling the PCO to retain control over those
offices not operating as effectively. Additionally, the
practice of issuing an all-encompassing instruction to con-
trol a process within which a limited number of infractions
have occurred should also be re-examined by NAVSUP. Well
managed contracting activities should not be needlessly
stifled in their operations.
E. CONTRIBUTION OF RESEARCH EFFORT
The researcher believes that this study has exposed
some serious deficiencies in the policy and procedural
aspects of R&D contracting within the CNM laboratory arena.
It is incumbent upon both field level and headquarters level
personnel to more fully understand the nature of R&D contracting.




F. AREAS OF FURTHER STUDY
Further study is recommended in the areas of, (1) Navy
Industrial Fund (NIP) funding in the contracting for ser-
vices in the lab community, (2) precise model development
for determining resource requirements in the contract manage-




























(Excerpted from Contract N00123-79-C-0051)
PART II - 71 IE S GIF. RULE
SECTION E - S'JPPLIFS/S^VICES 5 PT.ICES
SCOPE : The contractor shall provide labor, materials and facilities as --nay
be required to develop advanced technology for the ATD/LASER Gyro Program.
The advanced technology effort shall include the technology required for
laser gyro product quality control, development of low-cost design variants
to minimize cost and maximize yield, such as Internal Metal Dither Springs
(IMDS), Improved Path Length Control (I?LC), mirror polishing and inspection,
investment casting of selected piece parts and remote electronics. The
producibility of this low-cost design shall be demonstrated and compared
to projected target costs. This effort will be pursued in accordance with
Section F herein and in accordance with individual work assignments as may
be issued hereunder.
LEVEL OF EFFORT
a. It is understood and agreed that while the contractor's performance during
the period from 2 October 1973 to 2 October 1930 hereunder is based upon an anticip-
ated level of effort consisting of 33 ,713 manhours of direct labor including sub-
contracts and intsrdivisional labor but excluding holidays and vacation, shift
differentials and overtime preniuns/such level of effort may fluctuate in pursuit of
the assigned technical objectives. In the event that tr.c number of manhours of
direct labor expended or to h expended in the performance hereof exceeds IlO'j of the
established level of effort the contract shall be amended to provide for a revised
level of effort and an equitable adjustment of the estimated cost and fixed fee.
Any such upward adjustment of the fixed fee shall be prospective only ana shall oe
based solely upon that part of the revised level of effort which is in excess of 110*
of the original level of effort, or, if said level of effort has been previously re-
vised, upon the additional level of effort which is in excess of 10% of tnc fee-
hearing portion of the additional hours by which the level of effort was last increas-
ed, and shall be based upon the application of appropriate cost factors adjusted to
the then current conditions. Notification shall be furnished to the Government in
writing whenever SS% of the established level of effort is reached.
b. In the event that less than 90* of the original level of effort, or, (if
said level of effort has been previously revised upward) of the fee-bearing por-
tion of the additional hours by which the level of effort was last increased, is
actually expended by the expiration date of the contract, the Government shall
have the option (i) of requiring the contractor to continue performance (not
to exceed 50 days however) until the effort expended equals 901 of the original
level of effort or of the fee-bearing portion of the last upward revision, and/or
{ii; of effecting a reduction in the fixed fee by the percentage i>y which the
total of expended ranhours is less than 90** of the original level of effort or of
the fee-bearing portion of the last upward revision.
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SECTION F - DESCRIPTION AND SPECIFICATIONS
DESCRIPTION AND SPECIFICATIONS
The work under this contract shall be performed in accordance with the following
requirements and in accordance with any other terms, conditions and requirements
as may be reflected herein:
Develop advanced technology for the missile-grade laser gyro. This includes the
technology required for laser gryo product assurance, development of low-cost
design variants, and a demonstration of missile-grade laser gyro producibility.
Using the Honeywell GG-132SAA laser gyro as a design baseline, develop a low-
cost gryo design and demonstrate the producibility of this design. The perform-
ance targets for the low-cost GG-1323 gryo shall be as defined in Table I.
Table I. Missile-Grade Gyro Targets.
Gyro Parameter Targets
Projected cost, average for first 6000 $23S0 each or leas
production units, FY 77 dollars
Predicted reliability 15,000 hours mtbf or greater
Maintainability No scheduled recalibration
Performance Honeywell Specification
DS 25S2S-01
Provide material and services necessary to accomplish the following:
a. Specific Analyses and Technical Studies to support reduction
in the cost of the GG-1523 Ring Laser Gyro.
b. Fabrication, assembly, and test and evaluation of components,
piece parts, and circuits used in the GG-152S Ring Laser Gyros.
c. Fabrication, assembly, and test of GG-132S Ring Laser Gyros
incorporating cost-reducing design innovations.
d. Analysis, test and evaluation, failure analysis and corrective
action studies, and analytical projection of the life and
reliability o£ the GG-132S Ring Laser Gyro.
e. Perfox*mance and acceptance tests.
Deliver to NWC the following hardware items (target):
a. Two (2) refurbished GG-1328AB Laser Gyros (interim low-cost design hardware)
b. Six (6) prototype low-cost gyros (design proof hardware).
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REMARKS
R.^ VM A/l-biTS TOTAL 450.000
This work assignment is funded by and subject to all the terms and conditions of the basic contract. In no event may cumul. live
expenditures under this and all other Work Assignments exceed the amount allotted to the basic contract for cost purposes without
a formal written modification to the contract.
The total summary cost estimate for this Work Assignment (including all revisions issued to date) is $ 416,667 F i us Jn
estimated fixed fee of t 33,333 for a total summary cost estimate and estimated fixed fee of $ 450. 000
Notwithstanding the total summary cost estimate and estimated fixca fee for this Work Assignment indicated herein, only the amount










Title: LGTA Prototype Development Work Assignment 1002 in the Advanced
Technology Demonstration Program
Ref: (a) Navy Contract N00123-7S-C-0 1 53
(b) Navy Contract N00123-79-C-0051
(c) Navy Contract N00123-76-C-1208
STATEMENT OF WORK
Provide materials and services to design, develop, and test Low Cost GG-132S
gyros to be used in the Laser Gyro Triad Assembly (LGTA) prototype under consi-
deration. Extend the configuration study pursued under reference (a) to include
Supersonic Tactical Missile (St\l) space allocation considerations. Pursue the prototype
triad and electronics design commensurate with this work assignment. This work shall
be performed within the scope and intent of reference (b).
2.3.2.1 LGTA Configuration
Extend the configuration and interface study performed under reference (a) to
include the packaging and compatibility requirements for the Supersonic
Tactical Missile (STM) of the LGTA. Conceptual design shall include LGTA
and digital computer systems space as well as STM/LGTA dynamic environ-
mental requirements. Include the results in a technical report and submit to
NAVWPNCEN.
2.3.2.2 Design Low Cost Gyro Blocks and Gyro
Design the GG-132S, C101, equilateral, IMDS block. New features to be
considered in the design will be an extended range Path Length Control (PLC),
Block Mounted Readout (3WRO), indium pressure seals for the electrodes and
"soft" seals for the mirrors and the use of a retractable getter. The task is
essentially to complete the work initiated under Work Assignment Task 5.3.1
of Contract N00123-76-C-1203. Update the existing drawings of the GG132S
laser block to an 1MDS/C10I configuration. Coordinate the design with
production to assure all currently available producibility features are included,
as well as all internal development results from the laser cavity design group.
Conduct a structural analysis of the laser block/suspension system and gyro
electronics to assure satisfactory performance in the anticipated environment
as specified in Reg. Memo 3141-109-7S. Conduct a thermal analysis of the
laser block/suspension system and electronics to establish temperature rise and
distribution. Submit structural and thermal analysis reports to NAVWPNCEN
for information.
2.3.2.3 Fabricate LC Prototype Blocks
Fabricate four W blocks incorporating the new design features determined
mutually between the NAVWPNCEN and Honeywell Inc. to be practicable
within the time and funding constraints utilizing low cost producibility tech-
niques and processes available. Fabrication shall be in accordance with the
approved Honeywell QA procedures 3-l-<* (ICS) submitted under reference (c)
and the Configuration Item Plan approved by the NAVWPNCEN prior to butld.
89

2.3.2.* Test LC Prototype Gyros
Prepare a test plan and submit to the NAVWPNCEN for approval. Testing may
be accomplished using an appropriate test fixture until the LC configuration is
available. Testing shall include ATP, thermal sensitivity, Input Axis (1A)
stability. Environmental testing will include vibration, linear acceleration,
shock, room and extended temperatures. These tests shall encompass the
above tests as well as any detailed tests felt to be necessary as a result of
incorporation of new low cost features. Deliver test results to the
NAVWPNCEN.
2.3.2.5 LC Gyro Electronics Design/Packaging
This task will be a continuation of work performed under Work Assignment
Task 5.3.1 of Contract N00123-76-C-120S. Review and update the existing
electronics specification, perform electronics partitioning to satisfy packag-
ing, layout, and environmental provisions of new improvement features. The
design shall comply with soldering specification WS6536 with deviations
required by the product and approved by the NAVWPNCEN. Initiate the
. physical and electrical design of the present electronics to incorporate the
following features:
(a) New, cost effective circuits such as the Pseudo Random Noise Generator
(PNG), Electronic Controlled Dither (ECD), and others determined to be
appropriate by the NAVWPNCEN and Honeywell Inc.
(c) Physical and electrical compatibility with the Laser Gyro Triad Assembly
configuration.
(d) Commonality of electronics, wherever practicable to reduce parts count
and maximize producibility.
Salient features of the design shall include:
(a) Low cost assembly techniques, where applicable.
(b) Low cost fabrication, where applicable.
(c) Ease of access and repair.
(d) Packaging in conformance with the LGTA configuration.
2.3.2.7 LGTA Mount Design
Initiate the development of the laser gyro triad assembly mount compatible
with the selected configuration. Develcp the design criteria for LGTA appli-
cations, generate layout drawings/designs of the triad assembly, and deliver to
the NAVWPNCEN for information. Initiate design analysis to determine
critical design features such as LGTA tradeoffs on acceptable coning levels;
structural and thermal analysis of weight versus required mount stiffness and
thermal gradient effects. Included in this design will be space and alignment
provisions for the three acceleromctcr package and associated electronics.
2.3.3 Concept Review
Conduct a concept review at Honeywell Inc., Minneapolis facilities in
accordance with WA 1001 to present the LGTA concept proposed and to review
the progress and problems incurred during the laser block fabrication and
assembly. This review will be used to identify and prioritize tasks remaining
for the development of a prototype LGTA.
90
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LISTS AND RELATED DATA REQUIREMENTS
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NWC CODE 31^1 20 Sep 78
REQUIREMENTS
In accordance with paragraph 6.2.1 of Military Specification DOD-D-10003 Subj : Drawings,
Engineering and Associated Lists dated 28 Oct 77, the following instructions for the prepai









D NAVAIR (30003) CONTRACTOR OTHER ( )
3. SOURCE OF GOVT. SOURCE OF GOVT. NOs. GOVT. DRAWINGS FORMATS FURNISHED
NOs. 6 FORMATS Q NO Q YES SOURCE
6.2.1(d) SNA
k. DO ANY PARTS OF
MIL-STD-100
APPLY TO LEVEL 1
D YES
(AMPLIFY)

















PARTS LIST PARTS LIST g] SEPARATE OR
SEPARATE INTEGRAL INTEGRAL
8. DRAWING ASSY.
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r-i MICROFILM AND TABULATING CARDS 1-1 DATA DECKU MIL-M-38761/l LJ MIL-M-38761/1
n NON-REPRODUCISLES (BLUELINES) pi REPRODUC 1 BLES (BROWNLINES)
































BLUELINES 1 (See Remarks Be. low)
Commander, NWC





BROWNLINES 1 (See Remarks Below)
Commander, NWC
China Lake, CA 93555
Attn: Rec Ofcr
For: Code 31 41
19. REMARKS:
Item 17: Submit copies to Technical Office (Code 31^0 NLT 30 days
prior to conducting concept review at Honeywell Inc.
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Item 17: Submit copies to Technical Office 'Code 3141) NLT 30 days prior to
conducting concept review at Honeywell Inc.





Technical Reports (Tit) can be issued periodically, when
Ccchnlr.nl information is suitable for dissemination, or
when the effort is complete. They are used to evaluate
progress or determine the technical merit of: tho item
being developed, the analysis being performed or
investigation being conducted, and to disseminate
current scientific and/or technical information.
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15 Dec 69
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Prepare documentation of the results of the efforts in technical reports specified
on DD Form 14 23 as follows:
1. A letter progress report shall contain brief statements on the status of
the project, the objectives and procedures per fornicd , data and results obtained to
date and proposed program for the next reporting period.
2. An interim technical report, when required, shall formally document the 2? fort:
and results of the period and at the date specif ic! on DD Form 1423.
3. A final technical report shall formally document all efforts and result:'; nu
the project and be delivered as specified on DD Form 1423. The format of the report
depends on the nature of the work and in general the report shall contain:
a. Aims and objectives
b. Positive and negative results of effort supported by significant data
c. Problems encountered and their solution.
d. References used (Publication:;, lectures, conferences, reports, etc.)
c. Calculation.'; required for complete definition
f. Tables and charts of results and .. ip.nif irant data
v g. Other applicable data and calculations generated in the program
h. Photographs, drawings, etc. required for adequate description
i. Conclusions and recoinmcndatj.ons
I




101 «Tinc* -o- -.31
Reports , Test NAVY
OI-T-2072/
UDI-T-202C5
This Itea specifies a unlfora content and format Co be
uaed in Che preparation of Cesc reports covering tests
on iyste=j, sub-systems, cooponents and parts.
.. i*»u* ftfc o. r c
1972 Aunust II
mi ni!i w4 user j )
3S (A3,EC > YD,SH > SAj
• DOC MQwiMO
N/A
7.1 Applicable to all procurement actions wherein test
reports arc required as a result of testing except those






10.1 The foraat of test reports shall be In accordance vlth para 10.1. a bclov
unless para lO.l.b Is cited on CD Fona 1423.
10.1. a KII.-5TP-831 of the Issue In effect on the date of the solicitation unless
otherwise indicated la the contract.
10.1.b CONTRACTOR F0P."AT
10.2 The Technical content of a specific test covered by the teat report shall
be Indicated by citing that portion of the applicable document (MIL. SPEC, US, ETC)
In block 16 of the DD Fora 1423.





Test Plan USA DI-T-32CU
>. ocicNi»noN/i
Provide a document that describes the planning and pre-
paration for test and the performance tests to be conducted
at each level of assenbly appropriate to the end items to
be delivered.





• . »PKOItL LIMiTanan
t. *P»LlC*TiO-/iHlt»Ht L 4T.O»il-i»
Documents the total test program to be established






1. The contractor shall prepare a test plan that describes test objectives and
the tests to be conducted. The following Dinimun information shall be included
as applicable: '
a. Test purpose/objectives
to. Identify each assembly to be tested, to include printed circuit cards
equipment group, subsystem, system levels.
c. Describe test 6et up at each level of test, Including diagrams end
sketches to illustrate the test set-up.
d. Describe or identify all test equipment required, including special Jiss
and fixtures.
e. Describe all test procedures, Including test sequence, test parameters
and participants.
f. Provide sample test data sheets to illustrate test data to be documented
and delivered at each level of test.
g. Establish criteria for acceptance at each level 'of test acd describe the
procedures to be follcved in the eveat of malfunction or failure.
h. Identify critical or unusual tests or test conditions
1. Overall test schedule.
2. The title page for the document shall contain the contract cumber, contractor*
name, security classification, equipment cr purchase description identification, dec-
unent title.





Drawings, Engineering and Associated Lis:s DOD DI-E-7031
*. OClCH'PTIOH/PUHPOJt
3.1 Provides information necessary for the acquisition of
Engineering Drawings and Associated Lists to satisfy Govern-
ment requirements of Level 1 (Conceptual and Developmental
design); Level 2 (Production Prototype and Limited Produc-







7.1 Tnis Data Item Description, is approved for use in con-
junction with referenced documents (Block 9) when the later
is incorporated in the contractual document as tasks to pre-
pare Engineering Drawings and Associated Lists. When listed
on DD FORM 1423, it will provide the requirements for acqui-
sition of Engineering Drawings and Associated Lists as appli-
cable to the "Level" specified in Block 3 of the DD FORM
1423, or referenced documents. *





10.1 Unless otherwise indicated, documents cited in DOD-D-10003 and MIL-STD-100B form
a part of this data item to the extent specified.
10.2 Level 1, 2 or 3 Engineering Drawings and Associated Lists ordered for delivery
shall meet the requirements of DOD-D-1000B and as defined on DD 70RM 1423, in accord-
ance with the Ordering Data (paragraph 6.2) of DOD-D-1000B, as attached or included in
the contract or order.
10.3 Selection of the specific types of engineering drawings, as defined in MIL-STD-
1003, required to meet a Level 2 or Level 3 procurement is the responsibility of the
contractor, unless otherwise specified in the contract or order, which may exclude
certain types, thereby permitting all other types as defined in MIL-STD-100B.




(Source: Naval Supply Systems Command)
JUNE 1976
Algorithm For Detennining Activity Procurement Authority Levels (Determined
Procurement Authority Levels Are $500, $10,000, $100,000 or Unlimited)
Do the number of required purchase actions to 10K dollars, whether accomplished
in-house or because of purchase authority limitations are forwarded elsewhere




Within the p-^st year did the
number of purchase actions accom-
plished in-house exceed 10,000?
YTS NO
2-B
Is the activity loca ted more than










Is the activity located more than 50






Is the activity located more than 10








Did the number of purchase actions








For purchase actions accomplished in-house during the past year using
ASPR 3-600 methods, was the production rate equal to or over .67 per buyer
hour expended-including leave, travel, overtime, etc.?






Within the past year did the
number of purchase actions








Is the activity located













During the past year was the average Procurement Administrative Leadtirr.e





Is the activity located more than




Within the past year did the number












Do the number of purchase actions from 10K to 100K dollars, whether
accomplished in-house or because of purchase limitations are forwarded





Do the number of purchase actions
from 10K to 100K dollars whether
accomplished in-house or sent
elsewhere for accomplishment






Is activity located more than 250











Tor formal purchase actions accomplished in-house during the past
year was the production rate satisfactory considering the mix of




For large purchase actions accomplished in-house during the past
year was the Procurement Administrative Lead Time (PALT) satisfactory










Do the number of large purchase actions over 5100,000, whether
accomplished in-house or because of purchase authority limitations





















Subj: ""Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR); duties thereof
You have been appointed as the Contracting Officer's Technical Representative
under Contract No. , Order No.
with
_
As such, your duties are to furnish technical instructions to the contractor
which provide specific details, milestones to be met within the terir.s of the
contract or order, and any other instructions of a technical nature necessary
to perform the work specified in the ccitract or order.
You are not to issue any instructions which would constitute a contractual
change. You are. not to tell the contractor ^ow to perform, but only what is
required of a technical nature. If doubt ens:s as to whether information
to be furnished falls within the contract scope of work, contact this office
prior to transmitting the information to the contractor.
In your surveillance of the orders, extreme car 1; must be taken to assure that
you do not cross the line of personal services. In administering the contract
or order, the difference lies within the distinction between surveillance,
which is proper and necessary, and supervision >'hi;h is il legal .
Surveillance becomes supervision when you go beyond enforcing the terms of
the contract. If you tell the contractor how, not what to do, the line is
being crossed. Then you are using the contractor's personnel as if they were
Government employees. You are then trar.s forming the contract into one for
personal services. This cost be scrupulously ivoided.
Specific duties which you are expected to oerfcm include, but are not limited
to:
J. Serving as the technical contact through whom the contractor can relay his
questions and problems of a technical, nature to the Contracting Officer in
concert with or through the Ordering Officer. The COTR shall be responsible
for nil Government technical interface concerning the instant contract or order.
2. Reviewing and evaluating contractors' croposals in order to furnish the
PCO or Ordering Officer comments and reconrnierid-it.\cns.
5. Assisting the Ordering Officer in negotiating revisions to orders and
acting as part of the PCO's negotiation tean as appropriate.
4. When requested, attending post-award conference.





6. On cost reimbursement, time and material, or labor hour contracts, moni-
toring contractor perfomance to see that inefficient or wasteful methods
are not being utilized and taking reasonable and timely action to alert the
contractor and the Ordering Officer to the situation.
t
7. - Conducting surveillance of contractor performance to determine if the
percentage of work performed reasonably correstionds to the percentage of
funds expended and alerting the Ordering Officer to any perceived difficul-
ties when such is not the case.
8. Reviewing contractors' progress reports and furnishing the Ordering
Officer written comments based on the reports and the COTR's personal
observations.
9. Being responsible for acquiring trip reports from all Government personnel
visiting the contractor's place of business for the purpose of discussing the
instant contract or order. This may entai.' reouesting such reports of per-
sonnel in other activities including higher heaaquarters
.
10. Being responsible for assuring that appropriate action is taken on
technical correspondence pertaining to the instant contract or order and
that adequate files are maintained.
11. Reviewing, in an expeditious manner, contractor invoices and supporting
documentation in light of the reouirement, progress reports and other input,
both documentary and fron personal observation, to determine the reasonaoleness
of the billing and its comparability to other documents. This is not invoice
certification, in the sense cf certifying the facts stated thereon, but is
neant te provide the added value of actual payment review. This review must
be done expeditiously and should no" become ?. source of undue delay in payment.
12. Alerting the Ordering Officer of any potential performance problems.
13. When performance schedule slippage is identified, determining causative
factors and reporting them to the Ordering Officer with proposed actions
required to eliminate or overcome the causes and to recover the slippage if
feasible. Monitoring the recovery according to the agreed upon plan, reporting
significant problems to the Ordering Officer.
14. Promptly furnishing the Ordering Officer with any contractor or technical
code request for change, deviation, or wj>:ver, including timely submission of
supporting analysis and other required docurren*.«;.*.ion.
15. Promptly furnishing a written completion statement to the Ordering Officer.
16. Being responsible for the timely certification, in writing, to the
Ordering Officer of the inspections and acceptance cf the services performed




17. Monitoring, or causing to be monitored, contractor performance using
the technique of floor checks. This requires actual on-site observation of
the contractor's employees performing under the contract and the review of
timecards/sheets or labor distribution schedules to insure the proper charging
of time is taking place. DCAA and DCAS cooperation in this effort is essential,
18. When contract provisions require the acquisition of property or material
as direct charges and the transfer of title of such property or material to
the Government, the COTR shall review the proposed acquisition for reasonable-
ness and shall assist, as required, the assigned Government Property Adminis-
trator in identifying proper disposition of said property or material.
The duties and responsibilities set forth herein are not intended to be all
inclusive. As specific individual situations arise that have not been covered
or that have created a question, bring these to the attention of the Con-
tracting Officer or Ordering Officer and obtain advice on how to proceed in
the best interest of the Government.
This appointment shall be effective through the life of the contract; however.
failure to comply with the above instructions -i.'.I result in your termination
as a COTR under this contract.
The COTR authority is not redelegable.
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